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Abstract: The principle of fair play is widely thought to require simply that
costs and benefits be distributed fairly. This gloss on the principle, while not
entirely inaccurate, has invited a host of popular objections based on misun-
derstandings about fair play. Central to many of these objections is a failure
to treat the principle of fair play as a transactional principle – one that allo-
cates special obligations and rights among persons as a result of their interac-
tions. I offer an interpretation of the principle of fair play that emphasizes its
similarities to another transactional principle: consent. This interpretation re-
veals that playing fair requires one to reciprocate specifically by following
the rules of the cooperative scheme from which one benefits, just as consent
requires one to act according to the terms of an agreement. I then draw on
the comparison with consent to reply to some popular and persistent objec-
tions to the principle.
Suppose that public transportation in your town is run on an open sys-
tem. Passengers are to buy a ticket at an automated kiosk before
boarding the train, though no transit employee or device blocks those
who do not have a ticket from boarding. Knowing a good thing when
you see it, you skip the ticket-buying part of this system and board the
train anyway. Have you done anything wrong? And if so, why was it
wrong?1
Some philosophers have argued that refusing to submit to the relevant
rules in cases like this violates the principle of fair play.2 John Rawls offers
the following formulation of that principle:
… a person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution when two
conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair), … and second, one has voluntarily
accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers
to further one’s interests. The main idea is that when a number of persons engage in a
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mutually advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty
in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions
have a right to a similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their
submission.3
The principle of fair play promises to explain the wrongness of some forms
of free-riding. Return to the public transportation case. According to the
principle of fair play, you have a special obligation to the other riders to sub-
mit to the same rules as they have.4 By withholding payment, you enjoy the
benefits of others’ rule-following behavior while refusing to follow the same
rules yourself. You free-ride on their efforts, and so violate a fair play obli-
gation that you owe to them.
The principle of fair play is a mainstay in many debates in moral and
political philosophy. It is perhaps the most promising basis for political
obligation.5 Some have also offered fair play accounts of state punish-
ment,6 civil disobedience,7 global distributive justice,8 and stakeholder the-
ory.9 Nevertheless, the principle is still widely misunderstood, and
philosophers often reject it on the basis of misreadings and bad argu-
ments.10 My aim here is to correct some of these general misunderstand-
ings, in the hope that the principle will be applied and discussed more
accurately in particular debates.
I suspect that one reason that the principle is not more widely accepted
is that many (including proponents of the principle) are confused about
the role of a more general form of fairness in considerations of fair play.
This confusion leads to a distorted picture of what fair play obligations
require, and the conditions under which fair play obligations arise. This
article aims to correct that picture. I will argue that the principle of fair
play is actually far more like the principle of consent than many realize.11
The key point is that the principle of fair play does not require beneficia-
ries simply to bring about some fair redistribution of benefits and bur-
dens, but rather to provide a fair return specifically by following the
rules of a cooperative scheme. Thus, the rules of the cooperative scheme
to which one owes a fair play obligation perform a function similar to
the terms of a contract to which one has consented. I will also show that
drawing parallels between fair play and consent helps to highlight fea-
tures of fair play that suggest convincing replies to some common objec-
tions to the principle.
After offering a close reading of the principle of fair play and identifying
its key elements, I will fill out the comparison with consent in the second sec-
tion. I then consider objections that the principle of fair play collapses into
either consent or gratitude in the third section. In Section 4 I respond to
the argument that a beneficiary of a cooperative scheme can play fair with-
out following the rules. Finally, I address the issue of causally ineffective
rules in the fifth section.
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1. The elements of fair play
Letusbeginby identifying theconditions thatgive rise to fairplayobligations.
I will use Rawls’s voluntarist formulation of the principle for these purposes,
for reasons thatwillbecomeclearshortly.Modifyingonly slightly the relevant
text fromATheory of Justice, we will say that:
(1) a person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an in-
stitution (rules condition)
(2) when the institution is reasonably just and fair (justice condition),
(3) and one has voluntarily accepted (acceptance condition)
(4) the benefits of the arrangement (benefit condition).
One further condition is made clearer in Hart’s formulation and Rawls’s
original discussion of the principle:
(5) ‘cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least
involves a certain restriction of his liberty’12 (costs condition).
The conjunction of these five conditions is necessary and sufficient for the
generation of fair play obligations. I have omitted some elements from the
various formulations that I take to be superfluous.13 The elements listed
above are the core of the principle of fair play.
I will now make some preliminary remarks to elaborate on each condi-
tion. Many will also be fleshed out more as I consider objections further
down. I am less interested here in defending these conditions than I am in
laying out some of the main details of fair play. One thing that will become
clear is that there is no monolithic fair play view about what some of the
thickmoral terms (e.g. ‘just and fair’, ‘voluntarily’, ‘benefits’) in the principle
of fair play mean. There are, instead, a family of possible conceptions of fair
play. Fair play theorists need not come to an agreement on what the precise
criteria for fairness are, or what counts as a benefit, any more than consent
theorists must agree on what counts as duress, or compromised agency, or
unconscionability in the terms of a contract.
Take first the rules condition. There are two necessary conditions for the
existence of a rule. First, rules must be regarded as requirements that those
bound by them ought to submit to, and not merely as guides for predicting
behavior. Thus, failure to comply with a rule must be thought of as grounds
for blame or criticism, rather than a curious aberration in a pattern. Second,
rules must be recognized as existing – otherwise they could not fulfill their
action-guiding function. As Hart famously argued, this recognition can
come in either of two forms: in the rule being practiced (as in systems of
primary rules), or in its validity according to the scheme’s rule of recognition
(as in modern legal systems).14
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The justice condition consists of two parts. First, the scheme must be just
in the sense that it respects our natural duties of justice (more on this in the
next section). And second, the benefits and burdens of the scheme must be
fairly distributed among its members.15 There is nothing about the princi-
ple of fair play that commits a fair play theorist to any specific view of
the substantive requirements of justice or fairness. But we can usefully dis-
tinguish between two broad views about how justice limits the possibility of
fair play obligations. Some prefer a strong justice condition, so that the in-
troduction of any injustice in the ends of the scheme, or any imbalance in
the distribution of benefits and burdens, undermines the possibility of gen-
uine fair play obligations.16 Others hold, more commonly, that the distri-
bution of benefits and burden must be reasonably fair, and the rules of
the scheme reasonably just.17 A scheme need not be optimal in order to
provide us with a set of benefits that is well worth the cost. Thus, there is
some threshold of injustice or unfairness past which fair play obligations
are extinguished, but there is some space for suboptimal rules between that
threshold and perfection.
I have included Rawls’s acceptance condition rather than Hart’s mere re-
ceipt condition mostly in order to present the most accessible versions of the
principle. I think that mere receipt is sometimes sufficient as a commitment
mechanism for fair play obligations, but a defense of that view requires rais-
ing other contentious issues in moral philosophy. What does it mean to ac-
cept a benefit? The clearest instances involve persons taking benefits
willingly, andwith the knowledge that they are the products of a cooperative
scheme conducted according to rules – as in the public transportation case.
Whether a person accepts a benefit is less clear in the case of non-excludable
goods, as there is generally no observable sign of the recipient’s attitude re-
garding receipt.18 But the sense of acceptance that interests us has primarily
to do with what the person wills. In this sense, acceptance is a psychological
state, not an outwardly observable performance. So what matters for pur-
poses of fair play is the recipient’s attitude itself, not her observable behav-
ior. If she has a pro-attitude toward receipt, knows of the scheme’s rules,
and the benefits are worth the cost of submitting to the rules (whatever the
correct account of costs and benefits turns out to be), then she incurs a fair
play obligation.19
Like the justice condition, the benefits condition raises controversial sub-
stantive issues in moral philosophy. If one is a desire-satisfaction theorist
about well-being, then whether something constitutes a benefit depends on
whether the recipient (or some suitably idealized version of the recipient) de-
sires it. Whether it is worth the cost depends on the recipients’ valuation of
the benefit relative to the rule-imposed cost. Objective list theorists, on the
other hand, may think that (at least for some goods) there is a fact of the
matter about whether something is a benefit and whether it is worth the
cost.20 Again, one can be a fair play theorist and hold any of these views.
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There is no need to insist that just one of them is bound up with the principle
of fair play.
The same comments about well-being apply straightforwardly to the costs
condition. It is essential that participants in the scheme incur costs in
supporting it, because otherwise there is no debt of fairness for beneficiaries
to repay. A beneficiary may show a lack of gratitude by not reciprocating in
some way, but she does not treat those who benefit her unfairly.
2. Fair play, fairness, and consent
Ronald Dworkin writes:
… there is no generalmoral principle that requiresme to contribute to the cost of producingwhat
benefits me: I may be selfish when I pass a street musician by without tossing him a bill, but I vi-
olate no obligation even if I have enjoyed his music – even if I have paused to hear more of it.21
Dworkin is right about one thing. A general principle requiring reciproca-
tion in all cases like the one he describes would have absurd consequences.
Positive externalities of others’ actions are all around us, yet we do nothing
wrong by enjoying these free benefits of social life without contributing to
their production.22
Fortunately, denying the existence of such a principle does not interfere
with the foundations of the principle of fair play. Although some philoso-
phers instead refer to it as the principle of fairness, fair play is a better term
for the central moral concern captured by the principle. The name has
proved to be a source of confusion, as it suggests a more prominent role
for broader considerations of fairness (or, relatedly, distributive justice) than
the principle actually allows. Fairness is a more general notion than is fair
play, and violations of fair play are not the only kind of unfairness. At the
most general level, fairness is a kind of impartiality between persons. Politi-
cal philosophers have lately been most interested in fairness concerning the
distribution of goods between persons. Thus, it is understandable that a
‘principle of fairness’would seem tomany to amount to the idea that any im-
balance in the distribution of benefits and burdens must somehow be
corrected.23 While the distribution of benefits and burdens clearly plays a
role in the principle of fair play, that role is far more limited than some have
suggested.
To play fair with others is to treat oneself as equally subject to the same set
of rules as them. Playing fair is, then, a more localized concern than fairness
more generally, as it occurs within the bounds of a cooperative scheme con-
ducted according to rules. Playing fair is not about the distribution of bene-
fits and burdens between people in general, or even with respect to all their
interactions. Thus, in a high school basketball game, the players may play
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fair even if one school is from an unfairly wealthy district and the other is
from an unfairly poor district. But while the background conditions that
are not governed by the rules of the game need not be fair, fair play is not
possible if the rules of basketball are unfair. An uncomfortable team bus is
irrelevant for concerns of fair play, but a smaller rim for one of the teams
is. So, playing fair does require a concern for distributive justice with respect
to the benefits and burdens of the cooperative scheme, but the scope of the
concern is no wider than that.
Since the imperative to play fair is a narrower requirement than fairness
broadly understood, perhaps we would do well to find another way of think-
ing about how the principle works. I think that we can best understand the
principle of fair play by comparing it to the principle of consent, and asking
what work is done by each part of the principles. It should be unsurprising
that they are similarly structured, as both are transactional principles: they
explain the allocation of special obligations and rights among persons by ap-
peal to facts about some interaction among those persons. John Simmons
classifies obligations arising from consent as ‘obligations of commitment’ –
i.e. ‘obligations deliberately undertaken’ – and those generated by the prin-
ciple of fair play as ‘obligations of reciprocation’ – i.e. obligations ‘generated
by the receipt or acceptance of benefits.’As I understand them, fair play ob-
ligations fit under the first heading as well as they do the second.
Obligations are incurred through consent by the giving of a sign of one’s
will to agree to a set of specific terms, according to which rights are then al-
located to the parties to the agreement.24 The two main functions to notice
here are specification and commitment. The set of terms, or contract, does
the work of specifying the rights to be conferred to the parties. And the
parties are committed to those terms by the expression of their will. That ex-
pression may, of course, be express or tacit, explicit or implicit. What mat-
ters is that it is a reliable signal of the intention of the consenting party.
We can locate the same functions in parts of the principle of fair play. The
work of specifying the terms of the relationship is done by the rules of the co-
operative scheme from which one accepts benefits. Since rules can take the
same forms as can the provisions of a contract specifying the rights to be al-
located to the parties, fair play can generate the same allocation of rights as
any contract. As we have already seen, acceptance (or, according to some,
mere receipt) of the scheme’s benefits is the commitment mechanism of fair
play. And again, though acceptance may be read into persons’ behavior (e.g.
going out of one’s way to get benefits), there need not be any reliable social
signal of acceptance as there must be a reliable sign of consent.
These are the most important structural similarities, but there is more to
the comparison between fair play and consent. Each principle offers various
kinds of protection against people becoming committed to bad arrange-
ments. Consent is valid only if the parties are sufficiently informed about
what they are agreeing to, and fair play requires promulgation of the rules
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to which those who accept benefits must submit. Consent to unconscionable
contracts is said by most consent theorists to be nonbinding. The analogue
for fair play is that one cannot be required to submit to an unfair set of rules.
But what about unjust rules? Simmons argues that Rawls’s stipulation
that a cooperative scheme must be just in order to generate fair play obliga-
tions is unmotivated.
The intuitive force of the principle of fair play seems to be preserved even for criminal conspir-
acies, for example. The special rights and obligations which arise under the principle are thought
to do so because of the special relationships which exist between the cooperating participants; a
fair share of the burdens is thought to be owed by a benefiting participant simply because others
have sacrificed to allow him to benefit within a cooperative scheme. No reference is made here to
the morally acceptable status of the scheme. Simple intuitions about fair play, then, do not seem
to provide a reason for disqualifying unjust cooperative schemes.25
It is interesting to reread this passage while imagining that Simmons is
criticizing consent rather than fair play.26 After all, nothing about the idea
of making an agreement with another person suggests that the agreement
must concern morally acceptable actions. Suppose the hitman that Jones
hires refuses to carry out his part of the contract after being paid. Does Jones
have any moral complaint for non-performance arising from the hitman’s
consent to the contract?27 This question could be answered in one of two
ways.
On the one hand, somemoral philosophers would conclude that Jones has
no moral complaint for non-performance despite having obtained the
hitman’s consent to the deal. The deal confers no moral rights to either
party, on this view, as its terms do not have the sanction of morality. Jones
can have no claim right that the hitman murder the target, because the
hitman can have no liberty right to do so. On the other hand, one could hold
that the agreement does generate a pro tanto obligation for the hitman.
However, that obligation has to compete with all of the hitman’s conflicting
moral requirements, and it is clearly overridden by his much weightier pro
tanto duty not to murder.
The important thing to see is that consent and fair play are in the same
boat with respect to this issue. All of the same content restrictions present
in cases of consent also apply to the possibility of the rules of a cooperative
scheme being transformed into moral requirements by the principle of fair
play. If I benefit from the rule-based heist that I pull off with my partners,
whether they have a moral basis for complaint (on grounds of fair play or
otherwise) if I make off with their share of the loot depends on how transac-
tional moral principles like fair play and consent work in general. If I owe
fair submission to the rules to my fellow heisters as a matter of fair play,
the hitman owes fulfillment of the contract to Jones because he offered his
consent. So, if this is not an insurmountable difficulty for the principle of
consent, then it is not an insurmountable difficulty for fair play, either.
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What we have in the principle of fair play, then, is the idea that one can
bind oneself to submit to a set of rules by accepting the benefits that are at-
tached to them as a matter of fairness. To play fair is to follow the rules of
the cooperative scheme to which one owes a debt of fairness. Submission
to the rules is the only return that qualifies as fair, just as doing one’s part
as required by the terms of an agreement is the only way of keeping to an
agreement to which one offered one’s consent. I will stop short of claiming
that the principle of fair play is a variant of consent, but the two principles
are clearly related. They address similar moral concerns through slightly
different means, as is fitting for the different contexts in which they apply.
And they work against similar background moral constraints about the
creation and allocation of rights. As I consider common objections to the
principle of fair play, I will revisit these similarities.
3. Collapse objections
Critics of the principle of fair play have also pointed to similarities between it
and other moral principles. In fact, some argue that the similarities are so
striking because so-called fair play obligations actually arise from the appli-
cation of those other principles, and not some separate principle of fair play.
Some claim that circumstances leading to fair play obligations are morally
indistinguishable from those leading to gratitude obligations. Others argue
that the principle of fair play is not only similar to consent in structure,
but that it collapses into consent. The features of fair play brought into relief
by the comparison above help us to see that both sets of critics are mistaken.
Let us first consider the charge that fair play is indistinguishable from grat-
itude. Daniel McDermott offers two main reasons to doubt that fair play
covers a distinct area of morality. First,McDermott argues that the fact that
goods come from a cooperative scheme, rather than an individual, is not
morally significant. McDermott considers a popular example, first given
by Simmons, of a well that was dug and maintained by a cooperative
scheme. A group decides at a community meeting to dig a well, and a num-
ber of them pledge to do their part in supporting the project. According to
McDermott and Simmons, the principle of fair play holds that if a person
takes water from the well, but did not join at the meeting or bear any of
the costs of supporting the project, she has incurred a fair play obligation
to submit to the costs.28 But, McDermott adds, suppose that it were not a
cooperative scheme that dug and maintained the well, but a single private
owner. Then it still seems that latecomers who take from the well owe the
owner some compensation. But it cannot be for reasons of fair play, since
there is no cooperative scheme to which such personsmight owe submission.
There are, however, broader considerations of gratitude that are present in
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both the individual owner and cooperative scheme variants of the case, and
these seem to explain the obligation to reciprocate (or compensate). So, fair
play does not cover an area of morality separate from that already covered
by gratitude.29
McDermott is right that the relevant moral phenomenon does not change
between the two variants of the well case. But that poses no problem for the
principle of fair play, because latecomers violate no fair play obligations in
Simmons’s original case, either. Takingwater from the well in the conditions
Simmons describes cannot be a violation of fair play, because there are no
rules in place providing that the benefits are open to new members who sub-
mit to some set of rules.30 One might insist that latecomers are still free-rid-
ing, even if they violate no fair play obligations. I have no objection to this
characterization, because I do not claim that every instance of free-riding
is a violation of fair play.31 Latecomersmay owe compensation for violating
the scheme or individual owner’s property rights, but they do not owe any-
thing as a matter of fair play, for they had no means of joining the scheme
under the rules. On the other hand, if there were rules providing for the re-
quired submission of those who accept benefits in both variants of the case,
then anyone who took water from the well would owe fair play obligations,
regardless of how many people were already supporting the provision of
benefits.
McDermott’s second (and related) objection is that receiving benefits
from a cooperative scheme seems no different from receiving a gift. Gifts
carry with them no obligation of reciprocity to the giver. Otherwise they
would be an imposition rather than a gift. It would be in keeping with the
norms of friendship (or perhaps an appropriate showing of gratitude) to
make a proportionate gesture in return, but the gift giver has no right to such
a return. So, McDermott concludes, it seems ad hoc to hold that benefits
from a cooperative scheme are any different.
The rules condition again allows for a ready response to this objection.
The difference between the gift context and contexts in which fair play obli-
gations are generated is in the rules in play. The practice of giving and receiv-
ing gifts is not governed by rules of reciprocity that could be transformed
into moral obligations by fair play. So there is a morally relevant difference
between fair play cases and the case of gift-giving: one concerns the morality
of rule-following, and the other does not. It could be objected that there are
indeed rules surrounding the practice of giving and receiving gifts. But if this
were so, it seems obvious that the rules would be very different than those in
cooperative schemes that require repayment of a debt. If critics want to
maintain that gifts are actually impositions if receipt of one requires repay-
ment, then they cannot sensibly hold that there is a rule requiring repayment.
And if there is no rule requiring repayment for gifts, then the principle of fair
play does not generate an obligation of repayment for receiving a gift. So
much, then, for the inseparability of fair play and gratitude.
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Some argue that examples commonly thought of as paradigmatic cases in
which fair play obligations are generated are better understood as examples
of consent. The most extreme version of this argument concludes that the
principle of fair play is not an independent moral principle at all, but rather
that it collapses into consent upon investigation. Consider again the public
transportation free-rider case discussed at the outset. One might agree that
there is an obligation to pay the fare in cases like this, yet deny that fair play
is the basis of that obligation.
Jiafeng Zhu offers a recent statement of this collapse argument.32 His al-
ternative explanation for the passengers’ obligation to pay the fare in the
public transportation case is that they offer their tacit consent to pay by rid-
ing without paying. The free-rider tacitly consents to pay the transit fare by
boarding, Zhu says, just as one tacitly consents to pay one’s bill in a restau-
rant by placing an order.33 If the system were run differently, with ticket
sellers blocking entrance to the vehicle, riders would expressly consent by
paying. But since the system is open (i.e. little to no effort is made to exclude
people from enjoyment of the good before payment), riders tacitly consent
to pay by boarding the train. In Zhu’s view, using the open system instead
of a ticket seller ‘does not change the nature of the public transport scheme;
it only makes the system more open, and changes the way people pay their
fares.’34 Thus, he concludes, the best explanation of the case is that the
free-rider violates a tacit agreement by failing to pay.
Zhu’s account of the duty to pay the fare rests on a mistake about the
nature of tacit consent. One offers tacit consent by remaining silent or in-
active in cases where doing so is a sign in the given context that one con-
sents.35 As Zhu has it, the behavior of a free-riding passenger displays a
reliable conventional sign to others that she agrees to pay the fare (and
follow any other relevant rules of the public transportation system). But
this is implausible. Short of an oddly explicit spoken declaration that
one intends to ride for free, there could be no more reliable sign that
one does not consent to pay than walking past the ticket purchasing sta-
tions and boarding the train without paying. If the behavior of a free-rid-
ing passenger qualifies as a sign of consent, then it would seem nearly
impossible to avoid signaling consent.
It would be more plausible to think that the free-rider incurs an obligation
to pay the fare regardless of whether she offers a sign of consent, and the
principle of fair play provides an appealing explanation for this result. By
accepting the benefits of the public transportation system, the free-rider be-
comes a member of the cooperative scheme of riders. However, she refuses
to submit to the rules of the scheme by skipping out on the fare, and so
claims a greater liberty for herself than that enjoyed by the other members
–whose paymentmakes possible the benefit in which she takes part. Submit-
ting to the rules by paying to ride is the only way she can play fair with her
fellow passengers. Unless she pays, she violates a fair play obligation that
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she owes to them. It seems, then, that Zhu has mistaken what Simmons calls
a ‘consent-implying act’ with a genuine sign of consent. Boarding without
paying does not signal that the free-rider intends to consent, but it does mor-
ally obligate her to pay for other reasons.36
Now, there are cases in which one does conventionally signal one’s con-
sent by accepting benefits. (Think, for instance, of ‘enter at your own risk’
notices.) In these cases, consent is a fine explanation of the obligations
that arise through the conventionally appropriate behavior. But the exis-
tence of such cases will not save Zhu’s collapse argument, for two rea-
sons. First, acceptance of benefits is not always a sign of consent, even
if it is sometimes. Yet it seems clear that one may incur an obligation
to follow the rules in such cases, anyway. For Zhu’s argument to succeed,
he would have to show that acceptance always signifies consent in the rel-
evant cases, or that the obligations incurred in these cases are based on
some moral principle other than fair play. But the public transportation
case is a clear example in which acceptance of benefits is not a sign of
consent, and fair play is a strong candidate explanation for the relevant
obligation.37
Second, even if consent can show that a person is under an obligation
in some case, that obligation may be overdetermined. In other words,
one could be bound to fulfill some obligation both because one consented
to do so, and as a matter of fair play.38 Take a case involving another
kind of special obligation. If my mother is sick, I have an associative ob-
ligation to her to provide for her care. But suppose that, for some reason,
I once promised a friend that I would take care of my mother should the
need arise. Then I owe performance of the same actions to him for differ-
ent moral reasons. If one were to declare one of these grounds invalid –
out of a concern for simplicity, say – one would miss morally salient fea-
tures of my resulting moral requirement. The multiple grounds of obliga-
tion in play in this case illuminate the fact that I owe the provision of care
to different people for different reasons. The same could be true of some
private variant of the public transportation case. I may offer my consent
to follow the rules of the train (pay my fare, keep my clothes on, etc.) to
the train company, and also owe the same thing to my fellow passengers
as a matter of fair play.
Although fair play obligations are based on moral considerations similar
to those that generate obligations of gratitude and consent, we can now see
clearly that fair play does not collapse into either of these other principles.
Even though fair play and gratitude are both to some degree obligations of
reciprocity, the role of rules in the principle of fair play distinguish it as a
separate moral principle. And similarly, while consent and fair play each
have elements of commitment, the commitment mechanism of fair play al-
lows it to generate obligations in cases where the commitment mechanism
of consent (a sign of one’s will to agree) is not present.
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4. Why follow the rules?
Playing fair with others requires doing one’s part to fairly distribute the ben-
efits and burdens of cooperation within a joint enterprise. The principle
claims that onemust follow the scheme’s rules in order to do one’s fair share.
But some critics have claimed that one might bear a fair share of burdens in
any number of ways.39 One critic even suggests that one is not free-riding if
one is taking a severe enough risk of being caught and subjected to punish-
ment, since risk is a cost.40
Zhu has also recently questioned the fair play rationale for rule-following.
He argues that fair play theorists have moved too quickly from a commit-
ment to play fair to a requirement of submission to the rules, and so leave
a ‘justificatory gap.’41 Though he concedes that the principle of fair play
may generate an obligation for beneficiaries of a cooperative scheme to re-
ciprocate to its participants in some way, he claims that it cannot bind ben-
eficiaries to repay specifically by cooperating – i.e. following the scheme’s
rules. As Zhu points out, fair play theorists need some way of justifying
the claim that beneficiaries do not retain a liberty right to choose how they
repay their debt of fairness.
Fair play theorists have an obvious initial reply. They may argue that dis-
cretion in how one chooses to discharge a debt is a benefit. Part of the cost
borne by the rule-followingmembers of the scheme is forfeiture of the liberty
right to choose their form of repayment. Thus, the fair share of the cost for
new members of the scheme includes repayment specifically by submission
to the rules. But critics have an equally obvious reply: if it is an additional
cost to submit to the rules rather than reciprocate freely (i.e. in a form of
one’s choosing), then one could still pay one’s debt of fairness to the scheme
through an alternative payment of equivalent value that includes that addi-
tional cost. In other words, one could retain the liberty right to choose the
form of repayment, and compensate the scheme for that extra benefit by
bearing a different burden of similar value. So, this initial reply will not
do. The fair play theorist needs some other rationale for the requirement that
one repay specifically by following the rules.
Here again we can better understand the principle of fair play by compar-
ing it to consent. Notice that this objection – why follow the rules? – has the
same general form as asking why one ought to perform one’s part of a con-
tract as the terms specify, rather than instead compensating others with
some payment of equivalent value. In other words, the objection aims to un-
dermine fair play’s specification mechanism. But the same objection, when
considered against consent, is plainly absurd. Few would be moved, I imag-
ine, by an objection to consent theory that the parties to an agreement owe
something to one another, but that what they agree to is simply one thing
amongmany that might satisfy their obligations. The terms of an agreement
are not merely a suggestion about what onemight do for the other party, just
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as the rules of a cooperative scheme are not merely a suggestion. The impor-
tant thing to see, again, is that consent and fair play are in the same boat.
What is at stake is the ability of transactional principles to specify the con-
tent of obligations, rather than merely establish that some amount of value
is owed.
Let us consider one possible argument for following the rules that
makes the consent comparison more apparent. Rawls writes: ‘The reason
one must abstain from [free-riding] is that the existence of the benefit is
the result of everyone’s effort, and prior to some understanding as to
how it is to be shared, if it can be shared at all, it belongs in fairness to
no one.’42 Rawls’s point is that the benefit that the scheme produces does
not belong to any of its members individually, since it was no one per-
son’s effort that produced it. Rather, the benefit is held by the scheme
as a collective agent, and can only be enjoyed fairly by individuals when
the terms of that enjoyment are established by conventional rules. In the
absence of rules the benefits may not be owned, and therefore not
enjoyed, by any one person.43 The rules of a cooperative scheme, then,
are the terms according to which collectively held property is made acces-
sible to individual members.
This argument may be rendered slightly less opaque by again thinking of
fair play in terms similar to consent. The benefit produced by the scheme is
jointly owned by default. The scheme’s rules concerning the distribution of
burdens and benefits are a kind of open offer, setting the terms for access
to the jointly held property. They say that an individual may enjoy the
scheme’s property only by submitting to the rules, and so acceptance of
benefits is tied to submission to the rules. If one simply takes the scheme’s
benefits and reciprocates freely, then it is as if one claims a right to bypass
the part of the transaction in which the wishes of the other party are consid-
ered. The free reciprocator ignores the scheme’s stated offer, imposes her
own will on others, and unjustly takes property to which she has no right.
She is better than the free-rider only in that she offers compensation for
her rights violation, though that compensation is also unilaterally imposed.
5. Fair play and causal contribution to benefits
Michael Huemer presents a related objection about rule-following. Intui-
tively, fair play is about doing your part to produce a group benefit, part
of which you enjoy. According to fair play theorists, this means following
the rules. But many cooperative schemes have rules that make no causal
contribution to the production of benefits at all. Huemer argues that it
could not be unfair to refuse to follow some individual rules, as they
may turn out to be either ineffective or counterproductive to the ends of
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the cooperative scheme. He proposes the following revised conditions for
the principle of fair play:
i) The scheme is producing a significant good.
ii) The other participants are bearing a cost that is ‘causally necessary’
to the production of that good.44
iii) You receive a fair share of the good being produced.
iv) Your contribution would causally contribute to the production of
the good.
v) The costs you bear in participating would be reasonable and not
significantly greater than those borne by others.
vi) Your participation in the scheme would not interfere with your do-
ing something more important.45
These conditions allow Huemer to give what he takes to be the intuitively
correct assessment about whether it is unfair to disobey causally ineffective
rules. His answer, as these conditions clearly suggest, is ‘no.’ Huemer de-
scribes a lifeboat case to illustrate his thinking, and to provide a not-so-sub-
tle allegory for contemporary democratic politics:
The lifeboat is taking on water. The passengers gather and discuss what to do about the
problem. A majority (not including you) want Bob to devise a solution. Bob thinks for a
minute, then announces the following plan:
i) All passengers shall start bailing water out of the boat;
ii) They shall pray to Poseidon to ask for his mercy;
iii) They shall flagellate themselves with belts to prove their seriousness;
and
iv) They shall each pay $50 to Sally, who helped Bob get elected.
You know that item (i) is useful, item (ii) useless, and items (iii) and (iv) harmful to most
passengers. Nonetheless, most other passengers participate in all four parts of Bob’s plan. If
you refuse to pray, self-flagellate, or pay Sally, do you thereby act wrongly? Do you treat the
other passengers unfairly?46
Again, on Huemer’s view, fair play requires only that one follow the first
rule. The view is attractive for obvious reasons. It seems pointless to obey in-
effective rules. Requiring obedience from those who can see that following a
rule will be wasteful is insulting and frustrating. And of course, one could
easily imagine even more ridiculous rules than those Huemer lists.
But although Huemer’s conception of fair play is within the family of
possible fair play views, it is not among the more plausible conceptions.
To see why, consider a similarly constrained version of the principle of con-
sent. Suppose we held that consent to follow a rule is invalid when the rule
is causally ineffective in promoting its end. As with Huemer’s version of fair
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play, this is a possible view, and from a certain ideal standpoint both views
make perfect sense. But that ideal standpoint is not one that is useful for
solving problems that require cooperation between non-ideally situated
persons.
Here is Huemer’s advice about disobeying unjust laws:
If a law is unjust, one may break it. But it is not the case that if one merely believes a law to be
unjust, one may break it; it depends upon whether one’s belief is correct.
There are many cases in which we cannot tell whether a law is just or unjust; justice is a
difficult subject. What ought we to do then? In cases where we do not know whether the
law is just, we will simply not know whether it is permissible to break that law. I can say
nothing here that will cause readers to be able to know in all cases what is just, or what they
ought to do. My only advice for such situations is that one do further research on the topic
(perhaps in the ethical and political philosophy literature), and then exercise one’s best
judgment.47
The same advice is straightforwardly implied by the causal effectiveness
condition. There is no obligation to follow the rule if it does not causally pro-
mote its stated goal. But here is the trouble. Sometimes, in order to secure
the cooperation of others in important joint enterprises, we have to agree
to do things that we may think are pointless wastes of time and resources.
But merely being able to utter words of agreement is not enough. That is be-
cause if, in uttering those words, we do not actually form valid moral com-
mitments to follow rules that we think are ineffective, then neither do the
persons with whom we must compromise in order to solve problems.
Return again to the lifeboat case. Suppose that no one will comply with
anyone else’s favored rule unless she has a moral assurance that others will
comply with her own favored rule, and that the boat will sink without mul-
tiple people bailing water out. (Stipulate, if you like, that non-compliance
with any rule will not be detected – until, I suppose, the lifeboat sinks.) Here
both the constrained principle of consent and Huemer’s version of fair play
will be disastrous. As the ship sinks, the passengers will all wish that they
could have committed themselves to follow the rules that they thought were
ineffective. Of course, Huemer might reply, they could just as easily wish
that they had been stuck on a lifeboat with people who all knew how to keep
the thing from sinking. But then again, we might all wish the same thing
about everyone in the world with whom we have to cooperate in order to
solve problems. Suboptimality is a hallmark of human relationships.
Huemer’s causal effectiveness condition, then, has the result of leaving us
helpless in the face of a common source of prisoner’s dilemmas – disagree-
ment about the effective means of solving problems. But this suggests that
something has gone wrong, as one of the main points of transactional moral
principles like consent and fair play is that they give us the ability to commit
to agreements with others in order to assure them that we are willing to
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compromise on our second or third choice for the sake of successful coop-
eration. Whatever else is true of morality, it is not a suicide pact. It does not
leave us helpless in the face of threats that could have been easily avoided
with something as simple as the ability to commit ourselves to non-ideal
agreements or sets of rules. So, while Huemer’s constrained principle of fair
play is a conceptual possibility, I think it is best thought of as no more than
that. We can be required to follow the ineffective rules of a functioning co-
operative scheme as a matter of fair play. Such requirements may seem
pointless at first glance, but they are not. Individual rules are only effective
in producing benefits when they are followed. What matters for the princi-
ple of fair play is that the total system of a scheme’s rules is causally
effective.
6. Conclusion
Many objections to the principle of fair play rely on misunderstandings
about what sort of moral principle it is. It is common to think of fair play
as a requirement of general distributive justice, with the fair play that it re-
quires apparently being the same thing as fairness in general. I have tried
to show that this is a mistake, and that once we reinterpret the principle as
being much like other transactional moral principles – in particular, consent
– we are well-positioned to see that it is far more plausible than critics have
claimed.
This article has focused almost entirely on the critics of fair play, so I
will conclude by summarizing the good and bad news for fair play theo-
rists. The good news is that many of the objections that have been leveled
at the principle for the past several decades can be answered simply by ei-
ther explaining the role of rules in specifying the content of fair play obli-
gations or drawing comparisons between fair play and consent. The cost
of this firmer footing is the bad news that it may be more difficult to meet
the conditions for fair play obligations than some theorists have thought.
In particular, fair play theorists will have to do more than point to the
production of benefits by some person or institution to establish that those
who receive or accept those benefits owe anything to the producer as a
matter of fair play. They will have to show that the benefit-producing
scheme is conducted according to rules that specify the content of obliga-
tions for new members of that scheme. This may mean that the principle
cannot accomplish some of the tasks that it has been assigned. But it also
means that the principle can more credibly address the problems for which
it is well-suited.48
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